Policy lessons from physicians’ strikes by Gregory P Marchildon
Israel Journal of
Health Policy Research
Marchildon Israel Journal of Health Policy Research 2013, 2:34
http://www.ijhpr.org/content/2/1/34COMMENTARY Open AccessPolicy lessons from physicians’ strikes
Gregory P MarchildonAbstract
Drawing upon the literature on physicians’ strikes from other OECD countries, the experience with physician strikes
in Israel is put into comparative perspective. There are both structural and ideological factors that help to explain
why there have been more strikes in Israel relative to other countries. At the same time, the dynamics of the strike
and divisions within the medical profession in Israel, may be contributing to policy drift. This is a commentary on
http://www.ijhpr.org/content/2/1/33.In their article, Leonora Weil, Gabi Bin Nun and Martin
McKee analyse the reasons for a series of doctors’ strikes
and work actions in Israel between April and November
2011, the first breakdown between the government and
doctors following the ten-year agreement originally con-
cluded in 2000. Although not involving all doctors, this
was the longest running industrial action by physicians
in Israel’s history, a history pockmarked by physician
strikes from 1973 until 2000. The question asked by the
authors is whether the more recent series of work ac-
tions was solely a reflection of physician unhappiness
with remuneration and working conditions or a more
profound symptom of a crisis in the publicly funded
health system [1].
This article is a welcome contribution to the sparse lit-
erature on physicians’ strikes. Weil, Nun and McKee
note that there is almost no scholarly literature on physi-
cians’ strikes in Israel. The situation is not much better
outside Israel despite the fact that physicians who strike
against the state pose a major threat to the government
in power, and bring into question the state’s stewardship
of public health care. However, unlike the case of Israel,
physician strikes appear to have been quite rare in the
wealthier OECD countries concentrated in Western
Europe, Australasia and North America [2]a. I would
suggest that this has been, and continues to be, the case
for both structural and ideological reasons.
In the majority of wealthy OECD countries, physicians
are in fact independent professionals whose contracts
with the state as well as payment mechanisms give them
a level of independence much greater than other healthCorrespondence: greg.marchildon@uregina.ca
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orworkers. Their interests are powerfully represented by
organized medicine which has done its utmost to protect
their professional autonomy and income. In his 1991
comparative review of the power of organized medicine,
David Mechanic found little evidence supporting the
conventional wisdom that the medical profession’s influ-
ence had declined since the Second World War [3].
Indeed, it would only make logical sense for organized
medicine to become more involved in protecting the sta-
tus and position of their members as government be-
came increasingly involved in the funding, regulating
and administrating of health care. In a number of the
richer OECD countries, the majority of physicians ini-
tially opposed the establishment of universal coverage.
(However, it should be noted, once it was clear that
more public coverage was inevitable, organized medicine
worked with the state on the program details to obtain
maximum independence and income for their mem-
bers.) Based on a study that analyzed physician strikes in
Canada and Belgium, this opposition was in part the
consequence of the majority of doctors sharing a com-
mon ideology – what we termed medical liberalism [4].
At the heart of medical liberalism is the assumption
that physicians are, or should be, independent, self-
employed actors with the freedom to determine the na-
ture of their relationship with patients and professional
peers, as well as freedom from state interference in their
clinical decisions and judgments. In those countries with
professional self-regulation, this freedom includes phys-
ician control over medical education, standards and eth-
ics. The self-employed ethos of physicians in these
countries means that they are more likely to view strike
action as incompatible with the professional and ethical
responsibilities, and they are less likely to identify withtd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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http://www.ijhpr.org/content/2/1/34other health workers (e.g. nurses) who have more fre-
quently relied on strikes to obtain their goals [5]b.
So why, given this, have there been more physician
strikes in Israel than in the wealthier OECD countries? I
think there may be some important structural differ-
ences. Compared to their counterparts in most (and
there are a few exceptionsc) of the richer OECD coun-
tries, a larger percentage of Israeli physicians are directly
employed on salary by the state or state-funded organi-
zations. While some supplement their income by doing
private work – usually on a fee-for-service basis – this
means that the relationship between the “average” phys-
ician and the state is much closer than in the majority of
wealthy OECD countries where physicians remain inde-
pendent contractors even if they work in public hospitals
and clinics. This means that the government in Israel
has greater control over both remuneration and working
conditions.
Salaried physicians within hierarchical organizations
are less likely to draw a sharp distinction between them-
selves and other health workers and are more prone to
see a strike as a justifiable means to improve their in-
come and working conditions. As in the Israeli case, this
may be layered on by more social objectives, including
facilitating improved access to medical care in peripheral
regions by providing additional incentives for doctors to
work in such regions.
Physicians do appear to be more ideologically divided
in Israel than the OECD countries I have covered. The
physicians who launched the 2011 strike expressed sig-
nificant dissatisfaction about the trajectory of public
health care in Israel and genuine concern about long-
standing access issues, based on the consistently declin-
ing public share since universal coverage was introduced
in 1995. In contrast, other factions – including the youn-
ger doctors who mobilized in the second wave of the 2011
strike – appear to be more concerned about improving
their income and increasing their independence through
additional, non-governmental, sources of income. In par-
ticular, many of them want the state to permit dual prac-
tice – public patients in the morning and private patients
later in the day – irrespective of the negative policy conse-
quences for the public system. I am not sure, but I would
guess that this second group of physicians enthusiastically
accepts the main tenets of medical liberalism.
If there are sharp divisions in the medical profession,
then a strike can actually exacerbate these differences as
any gain by one faction are potentially viewed as a loss
by the others. It can also facilitate policy drift by the
government in power; that is, allowing it to politically
steer a given policy (e.g. universal health care coverage)
away from its original scope and purpose even while
making the result appear a natural consequence of fac-
tors beyond the government’s control [6].Moreover, faced by incompatible demands from a di-
vided medical profession, the government can minimize
political and fiscal risk by lowballing the final settlement
– conceding the minimum possible in terms of the pro-
fession’s original demands. This allows the government
to avoid hard directional decisions on policy in terms of
changing the structures of the original policies even
while subverting their original purpose. For example,
while the government might pay doctors more to pro-
vide additional access in peripheral regions, it is unwill-
ing to reverse the quiet but steady decline in the public
share of funding. At the same time, the government is
not prepared to reverse the rules prohibiting dual prac-
tice as it does not want to change the structures of the
original policy in order to avoid being seen as actively
undermining the public health system.
Endnotes
aHowever, this must remain a tentative statement until
a systematic and comprehensive comparison of physi-
cians’ strikes across countries is completed.
bIn several OECD countries, the government's is in-
volved in setting physician fee schedules. Further re-
search is needed to explore the extent to which this
provides an impetus for work actions and why this is so.
cBased on a study of 14 OECD countries, in only two
(Iceland and Finland) were the general practitioners
(GPs) salaried as opposed to self-employed, while four
countries beyond Iceland and Finland (United Kingdom,
Denmark, Hungary and the Czech Republic) had salaried
rather than self-employed specialists [7]. Further re-
search would be needed to understand why this has not
led to more strike activity in the minority of countries
with salaried physicians.
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